Convergence, Noninstrumental Value and the Semantics of 'Love': Reply to Norton

Environmental Values 17 (1):15-21 (2008)
Bryan Norton argues that my recent critique of anthropocentrism presupposes J. Baird Callicott's philosophically problematic distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value and that the problems that it raises for anthropocentrism in general are in fact only problems for strong anthropocentrism. I argue, first, that my own view does not presuppose Callicott's distinction, nor any claims about instrumental value, and second, that the problems it raises for anthropocentrism apply to weak and strong anthropocentrism alike
Keywords environment  value  ethics  Bryan Norton  intrinsic value  instrumental value  anthropocentrism
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DOI 10.3197/096327108X271923
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