David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 164 (3):747-765 (2013)
Neosentimentalist accounts of value need an explanation of which of the sentiments they discuss are pro-attitudes, which attitudes are con-attitudes, and why. I argue that this project has long been neglected in the philosophical literature, even by those who make extensive use of the distinction between pro- and con-attitudes. Using the attitudes of awe and respect as exemplars, I argue that it is not at all clear what if anything makes these attitudes pro-attitudes. I conclude that neither our intuitive sense of the distinction nor the vague accounts of it that exist in the philosophical literature are especially helpful in sorting out the hard cases. What is needed is a more explicit and thorough account of what the valence of our attitudes consists in
|Keywords||Awe Respect Neosentimentalism Valence Pro-attitude|
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References found in this work BETA
John Locke (2008/1995). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Oxford University Press.
Martha C. Nussbaum (2001). Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions. Cambridge University Press.
Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Jesse J. Prinz (2004). Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of the Emotions. Oxford University Press.
Derek Parfit (2011). On What Matters. Oxford University Press.
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