Binding and its consequences

Philosophical Studies 149 (1):49-71 (2010)
Abstract
In “Bayesianism, Infinite Decisions, and Binding”, Arntzenius et al. (Mind 113:251–283, 2004 ) present cases in which agents who cannot bind themselves are driven by standard decision theory to choose sequences of actions with disastrous consequences. They defend standard decision theory by arguing that if a decision rule leads agents to disaster only when they cannot bind themselves, this should not be taken to be a mark against the decision rule. I show that this claim has surprising implications for a number of other debates in decision theory. I then assess the plausibility of this claim, and suggest that it should be rejected.
Keywords Decision theory  Binding  Causal  Evidential  Decision instability
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Ellery Eells (1985). Weirich on Decision Instability. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (4):473 – 478.

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