David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 158 (2):257-287 (2012)
In Reasons and Persons, Parfit (1984) posed a challenge: provide a satisfying normative account that solves the Non-Identity Problem, avoids the Repugnant and Absurd Conclusions, and solves the Mere-Addition Paradox. In response, some have suggested that we look toward person-affecting views of morality for a solution. But the person-affecting views that have been offered so far have been unable to satisfy Parfit's four requirements, and these views have been subject to a number of independent complaints. This paper describes a person-affecting account which meets Parfit's challenge. The account satisfies Parfit's four requirements, and avoids many of the criticisms that have been raised against person-affecting views.
|Keywords||Repugnant conclusion Non-identity problem Mere-addition paradox Person-affecting view Parfit Counterpart|
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References found in this work BETA
Derek Parfit (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press.
David K. Lewis (1986/2001). On the Plurality of Worlds. Blackwell Publishers.
John Broome (1999). Ethics Out of Economics. Cambridge University Press.
Caspar Hare (2007). Voices From Another World: Must We Respect the Interests of People Who Do Not, and Will Never, Exist? Ethics 117 (3):498-523.
Stuart Rachels (1998). Counterexamples to the Transitivity of Better Than. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1):71 – 83.
Citations of this work BETA
Nicola Jane Williams (2013). Possible Persons and the Problem of Prenatal Harm. Journal of Ethics 17 (4):355-385.
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