Person-affecting views and saturating counterpart relations

Philosophical Studies 158 (2):257-287 (2012)
In Reasons and Persons, Parfit (1984) posed a challenge: provide a satisfying normative account that solves the Non-Identity Problem, avoids the Repugnant and Absurd Conclusions, and solves the Mere-Addition Paradox. In response, some have suggested that we look toward person-affecting views of morality for a solution. But the person-affecting views that have been offered so far have been unable to satisfy Parfit's four requirements, and these views have been subject to a number of independent complaints. This paper describes a person-affecting account which meets Parfit's challenge. The account satisfies Parfit's four requirements, and avoids many of the criticisms that have been raised against person-affecting views.
Keywords Repugnant conclusion  Non-identity problem  Mere-addition paradox  Person-affecting view  Parfit  Counterpart
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9884-9
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Stuart Rachels (1998). Counterexamples to the Transitivity of Better Than. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1):71 – 83.

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