David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):641 - 663 (2011)
Representation theorems are often taken to provide the foundations for decision theory. First, they are taken to characterize degrees of belief and utilities. Second, they are taken to justify two fundamental rules of rationality: that we should have probabilistic degrees of belief and that we should act as expected utility maximizers. We argue that representation theorems cannot serve either of these foundational purposes, and that recent attempts to defend the foundational importance of representation theorems are unsuccessful. As a result, we should reject these claims, and lay the foundations of decision theory on firmer ground
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References found in this work BETA
Maurice Allais & Ole Hagen (eds.) (1979). Expected Utility Hypotheses and the Allais Paradox. D. Reidel.
David Christensen (1996). Dutch-Book Arguments Depragmatized: Epistemic Consistency for Partial Believers. Journal of Philosophy 93 (9):450-479.
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David Christensen (2004). Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief. Oxford University Press.
Lina Eriksson & Alan Hájek (2007). What Are Degrees of Belief? Studia Logica 86 (2):185-215.
Citations of this work BETA
Brian Hedden (2013). Incoherence Without Exploitability. Noûs 47 (3):482-495.
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