Two mistakes regarding the principal principle

This paper examines two mistakes regarding David Lewis’ Principal Principle that have appeared in the recent literature. These particular mistakes are worth looking at for several reasons: The thoughts that lead to these mistakes are natural ones, the principles that result from these mistakes are untenable, and these mistakes have led to significant misconceptions regarding the role of admissibility and time. After correcting these mistakes, the paper discusses the correct roles of time and admissibility. With these results in hand, the paper concludes by showing that one way of formulating the chance–credence relation has a distinct advantage over its rivals
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/axp044
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PhilPapers Archive Christopher J. G. Meacham, Two mistakes regarding the principal principle
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1979). Attitudes de Dicto and de Se. Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.

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Citations of this work BETA
Jonathan Weisberg (2015). Updating, Undermining, and Independence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (1):121-159.

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