David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 3. Oxford University Press 86 (2010)
A number of cases involving self-locating beliefs have been discussed in the Bayesian literature. I suggest that many of these cases, such as the sleeping beauty case, are entangled with issues that are independent of self-locating beliefs per se. In light of this, I propose a division of labor: we should address each of these issues separately before we try to provide a comprehensive account of belief updating. By way of example, I sketch some ways of extending Bayesianism in order to accommodate these issues. Then, putting these other issues aside, I sketch some ways of extending Bayesianism in order to accommodate self-locating beliefs. Finally, I propose a constraint on updating rules, the "Learning Principle", which rules out certain kinds of troubling belief changes, and I use this principle to assess some of the available options.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Michael G. Titelbaum (2013). Ten Reasons to Care About the Sleeping Beauty Problem. Philosophy Compass 8 (11):1003-1017.
Wolfgang Schwarz (2012). Changing Minds in a Changing World. Philosophical Studies 159 (2):219-239.
Michael G. Titelbaum (2012). An Embarrassment for Double-Halfers. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):146-151.
Jennifer Carr (2015). Epistemic Expansions. Res Philosophica 92 (2):217-236.
Wolfgang Schwarz (2015). Belief Update Across Fission. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (3):659-682.
Similar books and articles
Stefan Schubert & Erik J. Olsson (2012). On the Coherence of Higher-Order Beliefs. Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):112-135.
Adam Elga (2004). Defeating Dr. Evil with Self-Locating Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):383–396.
Danielle Bromwich (2010). Clearing Conceptual Space for Cognitivist Motivational Internalism. Philosophical Studies 148 (3):343 - 367.
Brian Kierland & Bradley Monton (2005). Minimizing Inaccuracy for Self-Locating Beliefs. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):384-395.
Darren Bradley (2007). Bayesianism And Self-Locating Beliefs. Dissertation, Stanford University
Darren Bradley (2011). Self-Location is No Problem for Conditionalization. Synthese 182 (3):393-411.
Added to index2009-09-14
Total downloads177 ( #8,331 of 1,725,575 )
Recent downloads (6 months)24 ( #38,708 of 1,725,575 )
How can I increase my downloads?