Neo-positivism about rights the problem with 'rights as enforceable claims'

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (1):143–148 (2004)
Sue James recommends an 'enforcement account' of rights, where a right is to be understood simply as an enforceable claim. I show that adopting this analysis of rights implies giving up non-rhetorical, important, uses of the word 'right' which are possible on the best alternative theory of rights to James's position: the ability to deny a moral right's existence, even where claims are effectively enforced; the notion of a right's violation; and the idea that rights imply entitlement to make a demand, and not just enforcement of demands. Thus, adopting James's position implies giving up much more than mere rhetoric about rights
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DOI 10.1111/j.0066-7373.2004.00107.x
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Siegfried van Duffel (2013). Natural Rights to Welfare. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):641-664.

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