Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (1):143–148 (2004)
|Abstract||Sue James recommends an 'enforcement account' of rights, where a right is to be understood simply as an enforceable claim. I show that adopting this analysis of rights implies giving up non-rhetorical, important, uses of the word 'right' which are possible on the best alternative theory of rights to James's position: the ability to deny a moral right's existence, even where claims are effectively enforced; the notion of a right's violation; and the idea that rights imply entitlement to make a demand, and not just enforcement of demands. Thus, adopting James's position implies giving up much more than mere rhetoric about rights|
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