Res Publica 7 (3):293-313 (2001)
|Abstract||Toleration and neutrality are not always distinguished. When they are, they are often offered as two complementary solutions for the problem of achieving political unity and a degree of mutual acceptance within a pluralist liberal polity. The essay shows the concepts to be fundamentally distinct, and then argues that instead of being mutually supporting, they are mutually exclusive. Neutralist liberals, it is argued, must give up toleration in favour of the virtue of neutrality on the part of citizens.|
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