Hume on knowledge, certainty and probability: Anticipating the disintegration of the analytic/synthetic divide?
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2):226–242 (2007)
|Abstract||This paper contends that the first argument of Hume's "Of scepticism with regard to reason" entails that humans have no knowledge as Hume understands knowledge. In defending this claim, we also see how Hume's argument anticipates an important aspect of an extremely influential 20th century development: the collapse of the analytic/synthetic distinction.|
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