Quine on Hume and the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction

Philosophia 39 (2):369-373 (2011)
W. V. O. Quine’s assault on the analytic/synthetic distinction is one of the most celebrated events in the history of twentieth century philosophy. This paper shines a light on Quine’s own understanding of the history of this distinction. More specifically, this paper argues, contrary to what seems to be the received view, that Quine explicitly recognized a kindred subversive spirit in David Hume
Keywords Quine  Hume  Analytic  Synthetic
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References found in this work BETA
David Hume (2009/2004). An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), The Monist. Oxford University Press 112.
Daniel Isaacson (2004). Quine and Logical Positivism. In Roger F. Gibson (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Quine. Cambridge University Press 214--269.
Michael Pakaluk (1989). Quine's 1946 Lectures on Hume. Journal of the History of Philosophy 27 (3):445-459.
Willard V. O. Quine (1951). Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
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