Easy's gettin' harder all the time: The computational theory and affective states

Ratio 18 (3):306-316 (2005)
We argue that A. Damasio’s (1994) Somatic Marker hypothesis can explain why humans don’t generally suffer from the frame problem, arguably the greatest obstacle facing the Computational Theory of Mind. This involves showing how humans with damaged emotional centers are best understood as actually suffering from the frame problem. We are then able to show that, paradoxically, these results provide evidence for the Computational Theory of Mind, and in addition call into question the very distinction between easy and hard problems in the contemporary philosophy of mind.
Keywords Computation  Emotion  Frame  Metaphysics  Mind
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2005.00292.x
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PhilPapers Archive Jason L. Megill, Easy's gettin' harder all the time: The computational theory and affective states
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David J. Chalmers (1995). Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.

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