Online research in philosophy

Organ trafficking and trafficking in persons for the purpose of organ transplantation are recognized as significant international problems. Yet these forms of trafficking are largely left out of international criminal law regimes and to some extent of domestic criminal law regimes as well. Trafficking of organs or persons for their organs does not come within the jurisdiction of the ICC, except in very special cases such as when conducted in a manner that conforms to the definitions of genocide or crimes against humanity. Although the United States Code characterizes trafficking as a transnational crime with national implications, (22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(24) (2010)), trafficking is rarely prosecuted in domestic courts. It has thus functioned in practice largely as what might be judged a stateless offense, out of the purview of both international and national courts. Yet these forms of organ trafficking remain widespread—and devastating to those who are its victims. In this article, we begin by describing what is known about the extent of organ trafficking and trafficking in persons for the purpose of removal of organs. We then critically evaluate how and why such trafficking has remained largely unaddressed by both international and domestic criminal law regimes. This state of affairs, we argue, presents a missed chance for developing the legitimacy of international criminal law and an illustration of how far current international legal institutions remain from ideal justice.

A large majority of theoretical debate with regard to criminal justice at the global level has been concerned to identify which kinds of punishment of international agents are morally sound. Three key issues have been: (1) international sentencing, which concerns the rightness of international tribunals to prosecute what might be called ‘large-scale’ or ‘humanitarian’ crimes; (2) extraterritorial punishment, most topically regarding the appropriateness of a state punishing a foreign national for acts committed against it or its citizens while abroad; and (3) punishment and warfare, where the main issue is whether punishment of a guilty actor on the global stage can be a just cause for war. This entry discusses all three topics, devoting the most space to justice in international sentencing.

In this paper I will argue that, international criminal law constitutes a valid legal system. There is skepticism over the authority of international law; some claim that it is not a genuine legal system, and does not command legal obligation. I will adopt a particular legal positivist position, known as moral attitude positivism, and apply this to an analysis of international criminal law. I will argue that the criteria necessary for a legal system on the positivist account are present in the international system of criminal law. Specifically, I will argue that a ‘rule of recognition’ can be drawn from a variation of the legal norm pacta sunt servanda, and this serves to validate the system as a whole. I conclude that the skeptic is wrong, and that international criminal law should be regarded as a valid legal system, commanding genuine legal authority.

The specialised vocabularies of lawyers, ethicists, and political scientists obscure the roots of many real disagreements. In this book, the distinguished American international lawyer Alfred Rubin provides a penetrating account of where these roots lie, and argues powerfully that disagreements which have existed for 3,000 years are unlikely to be resolved soon. Current attempts to make 'war crimes' or 'terrorism' criminal under international law seem doomed to fail for the same reasons that attempts failed in the early nineteenth century to make piracy, war crimes, and the international traffic in slaves criminal under the law of nations. And for the same reasons, Professor Rubin argues, it is unlikely that an international criminal court can be instituted today to enforce ethicists' versions of 'international law'.

The Grammar of Criminal Law is a 3-volume work that addresses the field of international and comparative criminal law, with its primary focus on the issues of international concern, ranging from genocide, to domestic efforts to combat terrorism, to torture, and to other international crimes. The first volume is devoted to foundational issues. The Grammar of Criminal Law is unique in its systematic emphasis on the relationship between language and legal theory; there is no comparable comparative study of legal language. Written in the spirit of Fletcher's classic Rethinking Criminal Law, this work is essential reading in the field of international and comparative law.

This book provides the first full account, explanation, and critique of extraterritorial punishment in international law.

International Criminal Law and Philosophy is the first anthology to bring together legal and philosophical theorists to examine the normative and conceptual foundations of international criminal law. In particular, through these essays the international group of authors addresses questions of state sovereignty; of groups, rather than individuals, as perpetrators and victims of international crimes; of international criminal law and the promotion of human rights and social justice; and of what comes after international criminal prosecutions, namely, punishment and reconciliation. International criminal law is still an emerging field, and as it continues to develop, the elucidation of clear, consistent theoretical groundings for its practices will be crucial. The questions raised and issues addressed by the essays in this volume will aid in this important endeavor.

International criminal tribunals are often criticized for having minimal influence on the states over which they exercise jurisdiction. This article argues that the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has had a far more positive impact on domestic governance in Bosnia & Herzegovina than previously assumed by both the academic and policy communities. The article develops a theoretical model to explain the impact of international criminal tribunals on domestic governance and tests that model against the ICTY's influence in Bosnia. More specifically, the article advances the claim that the nature of the tribunal's jurisdictional relationship with domestic judicial institutions and the incentives for national and international officials created by that jurisdiction interacted with changing preferences of domestic actors, thereby catalyzing judicial reform and institutional development in Bosnia. Based on an in-depth study of the ICTY's interactions with Bosnia from 1994 to 2006, the article presents new empirical evidence of the Tribunal's early effect of freezing out the activation of the domestic judiciary in Bosnia and its later role in the establishment of the new State Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina with war crimes jurisdiction The article attributes the variance in the Tribunal's influence over time in large part to changes in its jurisdictional relationship with national courts brought about by the ICTY's Completion Strategy and suggests the significance of a tribunal's institutional design, and particularly its jurisdictional relationship, for the direction and intensity of its influence on domestic institutional development.

Hybrid tribunals are typically presented as the result of pragmatic institutional design choices (tribunal fatigue, no Security Council resolution), or as better transitional justice tools (because of their claimed proximity to the populations involved). In this article I try to elaborate a more principled theory of hybrid tribunals by showing that one of the key functions of international criminal justice, sociologically, is to "represent" the crime and its particular nature. By taking seriously the fact that international crimes are both international and local, hybrid tribunals arguably make better sense of our intuitions about what is at stake.