Naturalism, physicalism and epiphenomenalism

Philosophical Psychology 20 (6):681 – 686 (2007)
I argue that physicalistic naturalism entails the falsity of epiphenomenalism. I conclude by briefly discussing implications of my argument for cognitive science, non-reductive physicalism, and the possibility of formulating a naturalistic form of dualism.
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References found in this work BETA
W. V. Quine (1992). Pursuit of Truth. Harvard University Press.
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