Online research in philosophy

This Handbook deals with the right to life, as guaranteed by Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and with the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights ("the Court") under that article. In summarising the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (and where relevant, of the European Commission on Human Rights, abolished by Protocol No. 11 to the Convention) on Article 2, reference is however often also made to more general issues, to other rights in the Convention, and to issues outside the Convention (such as other European or United Nations standards), as reflected in that case-law. This handbook is aimed, in particular, at judges and other legal professionals such as prosecutors and practising lawyers. These need to understand the Convention and the case-law of the Court, in particular when the Convention is formally part of their domestic legal systems - as is the case in most of the member States of the Council of Europe. Indeed, in law, the Convention in many European countries overrides ordinary domestic law. It is therefore crucial for these legal practitioners to be aware of the detailed requirements of the Convention. More specifically, it follows from the supremacy of the Convention that the interpretation of the Convention by the European Court of Human Rights should also be followed by the national courts in these countries. The Court's judgments are not merely advisory or relevant to the respondent State in a given case only. Rather, in Council of Europe member States in which domestic law or jurisprudence proclaims the supremacy of international law in general, and/or of international human rights law or the Convention in particular, the domestic courts must follow the European Court of Human Rights' interpretations of the Convention in their own jurisprudence. It is hoped that this handbook, together with the other handbooks already issued, will help them do so.

The Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine confuses respect for a person's right to self-determination with concern about protecting human beings generally. In a legal document, this mixture of deontological with utilitarian considerations undermines what it should preserve: respect for human dignity as the foundation of modern rights-based democracies. Falling prey to the ambiguity of freedom, the Convention blurs the dividing line between morality and the law. The document should be remedied through distinguishing fundamental rights from social 'rights', persons as entitled to the right to self-determination from born humans as entitled to the right to life and from members of the human species as entitled to the morally respo-nsible care of voting majorities. For the cultivating of the required responsibility, the conditions for an adequate public debate should be secured.

Currently, the universal human rights model relies on the notion of individual human rights. According to Michael Ignatieff, this is based on the fact that universal human rights are necessarily individual rights. However, there are cultures in which persons define themselves as relational beings (firmly believing that the foundation of their value as persons rests in their being an integral part of a larger whole rather than their being identified as an individual self). Thus, the problem arises as to whether universal human rights can apply to such persons. In this paper, I will argue that Ignatieff is mistaken; there can be (both theoretically and practically) collective human rights. Moreover, respect for human agency requires us to incorporate collective human rights into the universal human rights model so as to make these rights applicable to all human beings—individuals and relational beings.

This paper asks whether statutory social insurance programs, which provide contributory tax-based income support to people with disabilities, are compatible with the disability rights movement's ideas. Central to the movement that led to the Americans with Disabilities Act is the insight that physical or mental conditions do not disable; barriers created by the environment or by social attitudes keep persons with physical or mental differences from participating in society as equals.The conflict between the civil rights approach and insurance seems apparent. A person takes out insurance to deal with tragedy, such as premature death, or damage, such as accidental harm to an automobile or home. Social insurance, for example, the United States Social Security old-age and disability programs, consists of government-run insurance to cover risks of advanced age and disability for which the private market has not provided affordable coverage. But the civil rights approach to disability posits that disability is not a risk, not tragedy, and not a damage or defect. Instead it is a maladaptation of society to human variation. This paper argues that a justification remains for social insurance under the civil rights approach to disability, and further suggests that expansion of social insurance for disability is both compatible with disability rights principles and supported by wise public policy.

Australia has traditionally considered itself to be in the forefront of nations committed to the recognition and respect of human rights, including the right to life of all human beings. Australia has signed and ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which codifies the right to life in international law. Australia has also signed and ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which codifies both the right to life, and a related right to survival and development, for all children and young persons. Additionally, Australia is a wealthy country with relatively well-developed health and social security systems, which include a wide range of specialist services targeted specifically to persons with disability and their families. Together, these factors would appear to provide a strong foundation for securing the rights to life and survival of Australians with disability. However, beneath these calm waters lie deadly currents. This essay analyses the degree to which Australians with disability effectively enjoy the right to life, as it is understood in international law. We adopt an expansive understanding of the right to life that views the right to life as far more than an obligation on states to merely prevent and punish arbitrary deprivation of life, as important as this is. Instead, we argue that the right to life requires states to pursue a range of positive legal, social and economic measures to ensure that this right is fully realized, especially in a disability context. We argue that the rights to life and survival for persons with disability cannot be effectively secured without some transformation of traditional understandings of these rights, and we examine the potential for the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to effect such a transformation.

On December 13, 2006, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The Convention is historic and path-breaking on several levels, both in protection terms for the world's 650 million persons with disabilities who may now draw upon its provisions in defense of their internationally-protected rights, and in relation to the unprecedented level of civil society input and engagement in the negotiation process. This sustained and constructive engagement has given rise to a dynamic process of dialogue, cooperation, and mutual trust that will fuel monitoring and implementation work, at national and international levels alike, long into the future. This Article describes both the negotiating process that gave rise to the treaty and the major themes and motivating tenets that underlie its substantive provisions. In so doing, it draws attention to the two overarching paradigm shifts ushered into international human rights law by the Disability Convention. These critical paradigm shifts are foundational to the Convention and the dynamic processes that brought it to life. Provided they continue to be actively and constructively embraced in the implementation phase, they will prove decisive in ensuring that the supervisory and subsidiary framework of international human rights law can successfully be engaged to effect real, meaningful, and enduring change for the day-to-day realities of persons with disabilities in all countries and regions of the world. The prospects for this are encouraging. The Convention received a record number of signatures on its opening date - eighty-four - and is expected to enter into force more rapidly than any other universal human rights treaty in history. In the face of such broad global support, the decision of the United States not to pursue ratification is highly troubling. The Article concludes that the U.S. position, particularly in light of the nation's strong historic commitment to disability rights, is unjustified and warrants reversal.

The enactment of the Hong Kong Disability Discrimination Ordinance in the mid-1990s was a significant step in efforts to ensure the enjoyment human rights for persons with disabilities in Hong Kong. The Ordinance, and the Equal Opportunities Commission established to promote and implement the legislation and helping to implement met with much criticism, from those concerned that it would have deleterious effects for Hong Kong, as well as from those concerned that it did not go far enough to address the disadvantage and exclusion suffered by persons with disabilities. Ten years of the legislation provides an opportunity to reflect on these concerns, the progress that has been made, and measures that may need to be taken to address new challenges, in the light of developments under comparable legislation in Australia and the United Kingdom. The adoption at the end of 2006 by the United Nations General Assembly of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its likely ratification by China means there is a need to examine the possible implications of the Convention for Hong Kong disability law and practice. The paper concludes with a number of proposals for steps that should be to taken to review disability law and practice in Hong Kong as China moves towards ratification of the Convention.

This article reviews the contributions of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) to the progressive development of both international human rights law and global health law and governance. It provides a summary of the global situation of persons with disabilities and outlines the progressive development of international disability standards, noting the salience of the shift from a medical model of disability to a rights-based social model reflected in the CRPD. Thereafter, the article considers the Convention's structure and substantive content, and then analyzes in specific detail the particular contributions of the Convention to health and human rights law and global health governance. It concludes with an exploration of the potential implications of the CRPD's innovations for some of the most pressing issues in global health governance, including the Convention's contributions to the principle of participation in decision-making.

The consequentialist project for human rights -- Exceptions to libertarian natural rights -- The main principle -- What is well-being? What is equity? -- The two deepest mysteries in moral philosophy -- Security rights -- Epistemological foundations for the priority of autonomy rights -- The millian epistemological argument for autonomy rights -- Property rights, contract rights, and other economic rights -- Democratic rights -- Equity rights -- The most reliable judgment standard for weak paternalism -- Liberty rights and privacy rights -- Clarifications and responses to objections -- Conclusion.