David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Erkenntnis 65 (1):25-45 (2006)
In the first part, the paper describes in detail the classical conception of intentionality which was expounded in its most sophisticated form by Edmund Husserl. This conception is today largely eclipsed in the philosophy of mind by the functionalist and by the representationalist account of intentionality, the former adopted by Daniel Dennett and David Chalmers, the latter by John Searle and Fred Dretske. The very considerable differences between the classical and the modern conceptions are pointed out, and it is argued that the classical conception is more satisfactory than the two modern ones, not only regarding phenomenal adequacy, but also on the grounds of epistemological considerations. In the second part, the paper argues that classical intentionality is not naturalizable, that is, physicalizable. Since classical intentionality exists (in the experiences that display it), the non-naturalizability of classical intentionality implies psychophysical dualism.
|Keywords||Consciousness Experience Intentionality Metaphysics Brentano, Franz Husserl, Edmund Gustav A Searle, John R|
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References found in this work BETA
George Bealer (1996). Objections to Physicalism. New York: Clarendon Press.
Fred Dretske (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press.
E. J. Lowe (1996). Subjects of Experience. Cambridge University Press.
John Searle (1983). Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Wolfgang Fasching (2012). Intentionality and Presence: On the Intrinsic Of-Ness of Consciousness From a Transcendental-Phenomenological Perspective. [REVIEW] Husserl Studies 28 (2):121-141.
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