David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (1):17-38 (2008)
The paper provides new perspectives for a dualistic conception of mental causation by putting causation that originates in a nonphysical self into an evolutionary perspective. Nonphysical causation of this type - free agency -, together with nonphysical consciousness, is regarded as being not only compatible with physics, but also as having a natural place in nature. It is described how free agency can work, on the basis of the brain, and how it can be compatible with the result of the Libet-experiment. The necessary condition for the existence of free agency is that the physical macro-world is indeterministic to a degree that is relevant for living beings, that is, for their survival and well-being. From an evolutionary point of view, and on the basis of the facts of consciousness, it is more likely than not that this condition is in fact fulfilled.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Dwayne Moore (2012). Causal Exclusion and Dependent Overdetermination. Erkenntnis 76 (3):319-335.
Similar books and articles
E. J. Lowe (1999). Self, Agency, and Mental Causation. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8):225-239.
David Papineau (2013). Causation is Macroscopic but Not Irreducible. In Sophie C. Gibb & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology. Oxford University Press 126.
Eric Marcus (2005). Mental Causation in a Physical World. Philosophical Studies 122 (1):27-50.
Jakob Hohwy (2005). The Experience of Mental Causation. Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):377-400.
Jakob Hohwy (2004). The Experience of Mental Causation. Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):377 - 400.
Michael Esfeld (2007). Mental Causation and the Metaphysics of Causation. Erkenntnis 67 (2):207 - 220.
Eric Marcus (2001). Mental Causation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):57 - 83.
Christian Sachse (2007). What About a Reductionist Approach? Comments on Terry Horgan. Erkenntnis 67 (2):201 - 205.
Alexander Batthyany (2009). Mental Causation and Free Will After Libet and Soon: Reclaiming Conscious Agency. In Alexander Batthyany & Avshalom Elitzur (eds.), Irreducibly Conscious. Selected Papers on Consciousness. Winter
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads94 ( #20,253 of 1,699,523 )
Recent downloads (6 months)11 ( #57,594 of 1,699,523 )
How can I increase my downloads?