David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 157 (3):347 - 360 (2007)
If coherence is to have justificatory status, as some analytical philosophers think it has, it must be truth-conducive, if perhaps only under certain specific conditions. This paper is a critical discussion of some recent arguments that seek to show that under no reasonable conditions can coherence be truth-conducive. More specifically, it considers Bovens and Hartmann’s and Olsson’s “impossibility results,” which attempt to show that coherence cannot possibly be a truth-conducive property. We point to various ways in which the advocates of a coherence theory of justification may attempt to divert the threat of these results.
|Keywords||Coherence Truth Probability Bovens Hartmann Olsson|
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References found in this work BETA
Peter Lipton (2004). Inference to the Best Explanation. Routledge/Taylor and Francis Group.
Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann (2003). Bayesian Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Erik J. Olsson (2005). Against Coherence: Truth, Probability, and Justification. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Michael Schippers (2014). Coherence, Striking Agreement, and Reliability. Synthese 191 (15):3661-3684.
Stefan Schubert (2012). Is Coherence Conducive to Reliability? Synthese 187 (2):607-621.
By Igor Douven (2008). The Lottery Paradox and Our Epistemic Goal. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):204–225.
William Roche (2012). Witness Agreement and the Truth-Conduciveness of Coherentist Justification. Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):151-169.
William A. Roche (2010). Coherentism, Truth, and Witness Agreement. Acta Analytica 25 (2):243-257.
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