Properties that Four-Dimensional Objects Cannot Have

Metaphysica 10 (2):135-148 (2009)
Abstract
The paper argues that four-dimensionalism is incompatible with the existence of additively cumulative properties, including mass, volume, and electrical charge. These properties add up over disjoint objects: for example, the mass of a whole composed of two disjoint objects is a sum of the individual masses of the objects. The difficulty with such properties for four-dimensionalism stems from the way this theory makes persistence depend on the existence of disjoint objects at disjoint times. I consider various possible responses to this difficulty and conclude that they all fail.
Keywords Four-dimensionalism  Persistence  Perdurance  Endurance  Temporal parts  Mass  Properties
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References found in this work BETA
Sally Haslanger (2003). Persistence Through Time. In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. 315--354.

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