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| Abstract | Isaac Levi's principle of direct inference, from an agent's knowledge of a chance to that agent's corresponding credence, is central to his account of chance. He holds moreover that this principle shows the 'gratuitous, diversionary and obscurantist character' of frequency, propensity and other metaphysical theories of what chances are. In this contribution to Levi's Festschrift, I argue that, on the contrary, his direct inference principle commits him to just such a theory, the propensity theory. | |||||||||
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