Noûs 37 (3):447–470 (2003)
|Abstract||Claims about agents’ abilities—practical abilities—are common in the literature on free will, moral responsibility, moral obligation, personal autonomy, weakness of will, and related topics. These claims typically ignore differences among various kinds or levels of practical ability. In this article, using ‘A’ as an action variable, I distinguish among three kinds or levels: simple ability to A; ability to A intentionally; and a more reliable kind of ability to A associated with promising to A. I believe that attention to them will foster progress on the topics I mentioned. Substantiating that belief—by making progress on these topics in light of such attention—is a project for other occasions. My aim here is to lay a partial foundation for that project.|
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