Can physicalism be non-reductive?

Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1281-1296 (2008)
Can physicalism (or materialism) be non-reductive? I provide an opinionated survey of the debate on this question. I suggest that attempts to formulate non-reductive physicalism by appeal to claims of event identity, supervenience, or realization have produced doctrines that fail either to be physicalist or to be non-reductive. Then I treat in more detail a recent attempt to formulate non-reductive physicalism by Derk Pereboom, but argue that it fares no better.
Keywords physicalism  reductionism  non-reductive materialism
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DOI 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00184.x
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Alyssa Ney (2008). Defining Physicalism. Philosophy Compass 3 (5):1033-1048.
Thomas W. Polger (2009). Identity Theories. Philosophy Compass 4 (5):822-834.

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