Conceptualizing Self-Control

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (1):136-137 (1995)
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Abstract

A pair of arguments suggests that self-control is not properly conceptualized on the pattern/act/preference model Rachlin proposes. The first concerns the irrational following of personal rules. The second concerns scenarios in which behavioral patterns an agent deems good come into conflict.

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Alfred Mele
Florida State University

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