Exciting intentions

Philosophical Studies 59 (3):289-312 (1990)
In this paper, I restrict the discussion to overt intentional action, intentional action that essentially involves peripheral bodily movement. My guiding question is this: If there is a specific motivational role that intention is plausibly regarded as playing in all cases of overt intentional action, in virtue of what feature(s) of intention does it play this role? I am looking for an answer that can be articulated in the terminology of intentionalist psychology.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00355746
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Bratman (1987). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
John Searle (1983). Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
Michael Bratman (1984). Two Faces of Intention. Philosophical Review 93 (3):375-405.

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Citations of this work BETA
Alfred R. Mele (1991). Dretske's Intricate Behavior. Philosophical Papers 20 (May):1-10.

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