Journal of Ethics 10 (3):283-294 (2006)
|Abstract||The author argued elsewhere that a necessary condition that John Fischer and Mark Ravizza offer for moral responsibility is too strong and that the sufficient conditions they offer are too weak. This article is a critical examination of their reply. Topics discussed include blameworthiness, irresistible desires, moral responsibility, reactive attitudes, and reasons responsiveness|
|Keywords||Blameworthiness Ethics Moral Responsibility Fischer, John Martin Ravizza, Mark|
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