How not to explain the errors of the immune system
Philosophy of Science 60 (2):223-241 (1993)
| Abstract | According to Mohan Matthen and Edwin Levy, certain immunological processes require explanations in which the immune system is attributed intentional states. This, they think, strengthens the scientific credentials of intentional psychology and undermines the position of those who argue that the scientific treatment of human action should involve the elimination of intentional description. In this paper, I argue that immunology does not and need not employ intentional explanation or description and consequently has nothing to offer those who seek to defend the scientific standing of intentional psychology by looking for other disciplines that "accommodate the intentional" | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,679 |
| External links |
|
| Through your library | Configure |
Matthew Ratcliffe (2006). "Folk Psychology" is Not Folk Psychology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):31-52.
Rob Vanderbeeken (2006). Can Intentional and Functional Explanations of Actions Coexist? The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9:143-147.
Nicholas P. Power (1996). Fodor's Vindication of Folk Psychology and the Charge of Epiphenomenalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 21 (January):183-196.
Alfred R. Mele & Paul K. Moser (1994). Intentional Action. Noûs 28 (1):39-68.
Kristin Andrews (2000). Our Understanding of Other Minds: Theory of Mind and the Intentional Stance. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (7):12-24.
Kristin Andrews (2000). Our Understanding of Other Minds: Theory of Mind and the Intentional Stance. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (7):12-24.
Cara Spencer (2007). Unconscious Vision and the Platitudes of Folk Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 20 (3):309 – 327.
Jeanne Peijnenburg (2005). Classical, Nonclassical and Neoclassical Intentions. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 84 (1):217-233.
Lukas Böök (1999). Towards a Theory of Reflexive Intentional Systems. Synthese 118 (1):105 - 117.
Mohan Matthen & Edwin Levy (1984). Teleology, Error, and the Human Immune System. Journal of Philosophy 81 (7):351-372.
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads4 ( #178,675 of 549,090 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,317 of 549,090 )How can I increase my downloads? |

