David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Oxford University Press (1987)
Although much human action serves as proof that irrational behavior is remarkably common, certain forms of irrationality--most notably, incontinent action and self-deception--pose such difficult theoretical problems that philosophers have rejected them as logically or psychologically impossible. Here, Mele shows that, and how, incontinent action and self-deception are indeed possible. Drawing upon recent experimental work in the psychology of action and inference, he advances naturalized explanations of akratic action and self-deception while resolving the paradoxes around which the philosophical literature revolves. In addition, he defends an account of self-control, argues that "strict" akratic action is an insurmountable obstacle for traditional belief-desire models of action-explanation, and explains how a considerably modified model accommodates action of this sort
|Keywords||Behavior Deception Epistemology Irrationality Judgment Rationality Self-control Society epistemic akrasia akrasia|
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|Buy the book||$29.51 new (56% off) $67.00 direct from Amazon Amazon page|
|Call number||B824.2.M45 1987|
|ISBN(s)||0195080017 0195043219 9780195080018 0195359879 9780195359879|
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Citations of this work BETA
Alfred R. Mele (2006). Free Will and Luck. Oxford University Press.
Alfred R. Mele (2007). Free Will and Luck. Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):153 – 155.
David Hunter (2011). Alienated Belief. Dialectica 65 (2):221-240.
Chandra Sekhar Sripada (2014). How is Willpower Possible? The Puzzle of Synchronic Self‐Control and the Divided Mind. Noûs 48 (1):41-74.
Tamar Szabó Gendler (2007). Self-Deception as Pretense. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):231 - 258.
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