Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception, and Self-Control

Oxford University Press (1987)
Abstract
Although much human action serves as proof that irrational behavior is remarkably common, certain forms of irrationality--most notably, incontinent action and self-deception--pose such difficult theoretical problems that philosophers have rejected them as logically or psychologically impossible. Here, Mele shows that, and how, incontinent action and self-deception are indeed possible. Drawing upon recent experimental work in the psychology of action and inference, he advances naturalized explanations of akratic action and self-deception while resolving the paradoxes around which the philosophical literature revolves. In addition, he defends an account of self-control, argues that "strict" akratic action is an insurmountable obstacle for traditional belief-desire models of action-explanation, and explains how a considerably modified model accommodates action of this sort
Keywords Behavior  Deception  Epistemology  Irrationality  Judgment  Rationality  Self-control  Society  epistemic akrasia  akrasia
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Call number B824.2.M45 1987
ISBN(s) 0195080017   0195043219   9780195080018   0195359879   9780195359879
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Citations of this work BETA
Alfred Mele (2010). Weakness of Will and Akrasia. Philosophical Studies 150 (3):391–404.
Tamar Szabó Gendler (2007). Self-Deception as Pretense. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):231–258.
Santiago Amaya (2013). Slips. Noûs 47 (3):559-576.

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