David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Quarterly 36 (143):212-222 (1986)
In this paper I shall attempt to characterize a central case of incontinent believing and to explain how it is possible. Akrasiais exhibited in a variety of ways in the practical or "actional" sphere; but in the full-blown and seemingly most challenging case the akratic agent performs an intentional, free action which is contrary to a judgment of what is better or best to do that he both consciously holds at the time of action and consciously believes to be at odds with his performing the action at issue. More precisely, in intentionally and freely A-ing at t, S performs a full-blown akratic action if and only if, at t, S consciously holds a judgment to the effect that there is good and sufficient reason for his not doing an A at t. What I am after in this paper is an account of a comparable, full-blown variety of incontinent believing, and an explanation of its possibility.
|Keywords||epistemic akrasia incontinence|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Cristina Borgoni (2015). Dissonance and Doxastic Resistance. Erkenntnis 80 (5):957-974.
Dan-Johan Eklund (2014). Is Non-Evidential Believing Possible? John Bishop on Passionally Caused Beliefs. Religious Studies 50 (3):309-320.
Cristina Borgoni (2015). Epistemic Akrasia and Mental Agency. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):827-842.
J. Christopher Maloney (1990). It's Hard to Believe. Mind and Language 5 (2):122-48.
Similar books and articles
Robert Audi (1990). Weakness of Will and Rational Action. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (3):270 – 281.
Brian P. McLaughlin (1990). Incontinent Belief. Journal of Philosophical Research 15:115-126.
Alfred R. Mele (1991). Incontinent Belief. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:197-212.
Alfred R. Mele (1987). Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception, and Self-Control. Oxford University Press.
Alfred R. Mele (1986). Is Akratic Action Unfree? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (4):673-679.
Alfred R. Mele (1983). Akrasia, Reasons, and Causes. Philosophical Studies 44 (3):345-368.
Arthur F. Walker (1989). The Problem of Weakness of Will. Noûs 23 (5):653-676.
António Zilhão (2010). Incontinence, Honouring Sunk Costs and Rationality. In Mauricio Suarez, Mauro Dorato & Miklos Redei (eds.), Epsa Philosophical Issues in the Sciences. Springer 303--310.
Alfred R. Mele (2002). Autonomy and Akrasia. Philosophical Explorations 5 (3):207 – 216.
Alfred R. Mele (1989). Akratic Feelings. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (2):277-288.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads44 ( #99,847 of 1,934,364 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #269,537 of 1,934,364 )
How can I increase my downloads?