Journal of Philosophical Research 21:405-416 (1996)
|Abstract||There are a great many philosophers and theologians who deny that acts of supererogation are possible on the grounds that no act whose performance is praiseworthy can fail to be obligatory to perform. Here I examine a position which affirms that acts of supererogation are possible but which shares with the opponents of supererogation the sentiment that it is frequently morally blameworthy to omit such acts. This view is endorsed by certain professional philosophers, but it also seems that many non-philosophers are favorably inclined to this attitude. Although it is difficult to offer an outright refutation of this view, I offer some recommendations for those attracted to this position in the hopes that their concerns ahout supererogation can be addressed in ways which do not necessitate endorsing either a strong or moderate version of the anti-supererogationist point of view|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Alfred Archer (forthcoming). Supererogation and Intentions of the Agent. Philosophia:1-16.
Justin Weinberg (2011). Is Government Supererogation Possible? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):263-281.
David Heyd (1982). Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory. Cambridge University Press.
Elizabeth Drummond Young (2013). God's Moral Goodness and Supererogation. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73 (2):83-95.
Douglas W. Portmore, Chapter 5: Dual-Ranking Act-Consequentialism: Reasons, Morality, and Overridingness.
Douglas W. Portmore (forthcoming). Supererogation. In J. E. Crimmins & D. C. Long (eds.), Encyclopedia of Utilitarianism.
Roderick M. Chisholm & Ernest Sosa (1966). Intrinsic Preferability and the Problem of Supererogation. Synthese 16 (3-4):321 - 331.
George Sher (2002). Blameworthy Action and Character. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):381-392.
George Sher (2002). Blameworthy Action and Character. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):381 - 392.
Jason Kawall (2009). Virtue Theory, Ideal Observers, and the Supererogatory. Philosophical Studies 146 (2):179-96.
Jason Kawall (2005). Promising and Supererogation. Philosophia 32 (1-4):389-398.
Added to index2011-12-02
Total downloads13 ( #87,888 of 549,065 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,252 of 549,065 )
How can I increase my downloads?