David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (2):159 – 170 (1990)
Abstract The paper develops a unified account of both deterministic and indeterministic laws of nature which inherits the merits but not the defects of the best existing accounts. As in Armstrong's account, laws are embodied in facts about universals; but not in higher?order relations between them, and the necessity of laws is not primitive but results from their containing chances of 0 or 1. As in the Ramsey?Lewis account, law statements would be the general axioms and theorems of the simplest deductive theory of everything; but because laws are not so defined, simplicity of statement is not a criterion of law?hood
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References found in this work BETA
David K. Lewis (1973). Counterfactuals. Blackwell Publishers.
Nelson Goodman (1983). Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Harvard University Press.
Richard Jeffrey (1983). The Logic of Decision. University of Chicago Press.
D. H. Mellor (2004). The Matter of Chance. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
James W. McAllister (1997). Laws of Nature, Natural History, and the Description of the World. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 11 (3):245 – 258.
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