David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (2):159 – 170 (1990)
Abstract The paper develops a unified account of both deterministic and indeterministic laws of nature which inherits the merits but not the defects of the best existing accounts. As in Armstrong's account, laws are embodied in facts about universals; but not in higher?order relations between them, and the necessity of laws is not primitive but results from their containing chances of 0 or 1. As in the Ramsey?Lewis account, law statements would be the general axioms and theorems of the simplest deductive theory of everything; but because laws are not so defined, simplicity of statement is not a criterion of law?hood
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References found in this work BETA
D. M. Armstrong (1983). What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge University Press.
Rudolf Carnap (1966). Philosophical Foundations of Physics;. New York,Basic Books, Inc..
Bruno De Finetti (1989). Probabilism. Erkenntnis 31 (2-3):169-223.
Fred I. Dretske (1977). Laws of Nature. Philosophy of Science 44 (2):248-268.
Bruno De Finetti (1989). Probabilism: A Critical Essay on the Theory of Probability and on the Value of Science. Erkenntnis 31 (2/3):169 - 223.
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