Moral responsibility and history revisited

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):463 - 475 (2009)
Compatibilists about determinism and moral responsibility disagree with one another about the bearing of agents’ histories on whether or not they are morally responsible for some of their actions. Some stories about manipulated agents prompt such disagreements. In this article, I call attention to some of the main features of my own “history-sensitive” compatibilist proposal about moral responsibility, and I argue that arguments advanced by Michael McKenna and Manuel Vargas leave that proposal unscathed.
Keywords Compatibilism  History  Manipulation  Moral responsibility  Responsibility for character
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DOI 10.1007/s10677-008-9131-9
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References found in this work BETA
Donald Davidson (1987). Knowing One's Own Mind. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60 (3):441-458.
Alfred R. Mele (2007). Free Will and Luck. Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):153 – 155.

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