Moral responsibility and the continuation problem

Philosophical Studies 162 (2):237-255 (2013)
Abstract
Typical incompatibilists about moral responsibility and determinism contend that being basically morally responsible for a decision one makes requires that, if that decision has proximal causes, it is not deterministically caused by them. This article develops a problem for this contention that resembles what is sometimes called the problem of present (or cross-world) luck. However, the problem makes no reference to luck nor to contrastive explanation. This article also develops a solution.
Keywords Incompatibilism  Indeterminism  Free will  Luck  Moral responsibility
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,392
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
E. J. Coffman (2011). How (Not) to Attack the Luck Argument. Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):157-166.
Alfred Mele (2007). Free Will and Luck: Reply to Critics. Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):195-210.

View all 15 references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Neal A. Tognazzini (2011). Owning Up to Luck. Social Theory and Practice 37 (1):95-112.
Andrew Latus (2000). Moral and Epistemic Luck. Journal of Philosophical Research 25:149-172.
Nafsika Athanassoulis (2005). Common-Sense Virtue Ethics and Moral Luck. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (3):265 - 276.
Alfred R. Mele (2003). Chisholm on Freedom. Metaphilosophy 34 (5):630-648.
M. Almeida & M. Bernstein (2003). Lucky Libertarianism. Philosophical Studies 22 (2):93-119.
Jeremy Byrd (2007). Moral Responsibility and Omissions. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):56–67.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-06-10

Total downloads

41 ( #42,265 of 1,102,934 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #62,013 of 1,102,934 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.