Moral responsibility and the continuation problem

Philosophical Studies 162 (2):237-255 (2013)
Typical incompatibilists about moral responsibility and determinism contend that being basically morally responsible for a decision one makes requires that, if that decision has proximal causes, it is not deterministically caused by them. This article develops a problem for this contention that resembles what is sometimes called the problem of present (or cross-world) luck. However, the problem makes no reference to luck nor to contrastive explanation. This article also develops a solution.
Keywords Incompatibilism  Indeterminism  Free will  Luck  Moral responsibility
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9757-7
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References found in this work BETA
Alfred R. Mele (2007). Free Will and Luck. Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):153 – 155.

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Citations of this work BETA
Alfred R. Mele (2014). Luck and Free Will. Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):543-557.

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