David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 162 (2):237-255 (2013)
Typical incompatibilists about moral responsibility and determinism contend that being basically morally responsible for a decision one makes requires that, if that decision has proximal causes, it is not deterministically caused by them. This article develops a problem for this contention that resembles what is sometimes called the problem of present (or cross-world) luck. However, the problem makes no reference to luck nor to contrastive explanation. This article also develops a solution.
|Keywords||Incompatibilism Indeterminism Free will Luck Moral responsibility|
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References found in this work BETA
Randolph Clarke (2003). Libertarian Accounts of Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Randolph Clarke (1997). On the Possibility of Rational Free Action. Philosophical Studies 88 (1):37-57.
E. J. Coffman (2011). How (Not) to Attack the Luck Argument. Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):157-166.
E. J. Coffman & Ted A. Warfield (2007). Alfred Mele's Metaphysical Freedom? Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):185 – 194.
Alfred Mele (2007). Free Will and Luck: Reply to Critics. Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):195-210.
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