Realization and the formulation of physicalism

Philosophical Studies 131 (1):127-55 (2006)
Abstract
Twenty years ago, Richard Boyd suggested that physicalism could be formulated by appeal to a notion of realization, with no appeal to the identity of the non-physical with the physical. In (Melnyk 2003), I developed this suggestion at length, on the basis of one particular account of realization. I now ask what happens if you try to formulate physicalism on the basis of other accounts of realization, accounts due to LePore and Loewer and to Shoemaker. Having explored two new formulations of physicalism, I conclude that my 2003 formulation remains the most promising
Keywords Metaphysics  Phenomena  Physicalism  Properties  Realization
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    References found in this work BETA
    Sydney Shoemaker (1998). Causal and Metaphysical Necessity. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (1):59–77.
    Sydney Shoemaker (2003). Realization, Micro-Realization, and Coincidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):1-23.
    Citations of this work BETA
    Paul Audi (2012). Properties, Powers, and the Subset Account of Realization. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):654-674.
    Fernando Birman (2009). Quantum Mechanics and the Plight of Physicalism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 40 (2):207-225.

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