David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (1):109-124 (2006)
My central question in this paper is how delusional beliefs are related to self-deception. In section 1, I summarize my position on what self-deception is and how representative instances of it are to be explained. I turn to delusions in section 2, where I focus on the Capgras delusion, delusional jealousy (or the Othello syndrome), and the reverse Othello syndrome.
|Keywords||Self-Deception Delusion Capgras delusion Jealousy Othello syndrome|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Lisa Bortolotti & Rochelle Cox (2009). Faultless Ignorance: Strengths and Limitations of Epistemic Definitions of Confabulation. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (4):952-965.
Similar books and articles
Andy Egan (2008). Imagination, Delusion, and Self-Deception. In Tim Bayne & Jordi Fernandez (eds.), Delusion and Self-Deception: Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation (Macquarie Monographs in Cognitive Science). Psychology Press.
Lisa Bortolotti & Matteo Mameli (2012). Self-Deception, Delusion and the Boundaries of Folk Psychology. Humana.Mente 20:203-221.
Tim Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie (2004). Bottom-Up or Top-Down: Campbell's Rationalist Account of Monothematic Delusions. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1):1-11.
Alfred Mele (2007). Self-Deception and Three Psychiatric Delusions: On Robert Audi's Transition From Self-Deception to Delusion. In M. Timmons, J. Greco & A. Mele (eds.), Rationality and the Good. Oxford University Press.
Max Coltheart (2013). On the Distinction Between Monothematic and Polythematic Delusions. Mind and Language 28 (1):103-112.
Tim Bayne & Jordi Fernandez (eds.) (2008). Delusion and Self-Deception: Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation (Macquarie Monographs in Cognitive Science). Psychology Press.
Andrew W. Young (1999). Delusions. The Monist 82 (4):571-589.
Marga Reimer (2009). Is the Impostor Hypothesis Really so Preposterous? Understanding the Capgras Experience. Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):669 – 686.
Thaddeus Metz (forthcoming). How to Obtain Meaning in Life: The Roles of Self-Inflation, Self-Deception and World-Delusion. Philosophical Psychology.
Alfred R. Mele (1997). Understanding and Explaining Real Self-Deception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):127-134.
Matthew Ratcliffe (2008). The Phenomenological Role of Affect in the Capgras Delusion. Continental Philosophy Review 41 (2):195-216.
Philip Gerrans (2013). Delusional Attitudes and Default Thinking. Mind and Language 28 (1):83-102.
Garry Young (2008). Restating the Role of Phenomenal Experience in the Formation and Maintenance of the Capgras Delusion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):177-189.
Added to index2012-11-13
Total downloads23 ( #86,867 of 1,679,364 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #33,661 of 1,679,364 )
How can I increase my downloads?