Surrounding Free Will: A Response to Baumeister, Crescioni, and Alquist [Book Review]

Neuroethics 4 (1):25-29 (2011)
Abstract
This contribution to a symposium on an article by Roy Baumeister, A. William Crescioni, and Jessica Alquist focuses on a tension between compatibilist and incompatibilist elements in that article. In their discussion of people’s beliefs about free will, Baumeister et al. sometimes sound like incompatibilists; but in their presentation of their work on psychological processes of free will, they sound more like compatibilists than like incompatibilists. It is suggested that Baumeister and coauthors are attempting to study free will in a metaphysically neutral way and that, because this is so, the incompatibilist elements of the article are out of place
Keywords Compatibilism  Decision  Determinism  Free will  Incompatibilism  Self-control
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,612
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Alfred Mele (2008). Psychology and Free Will: A Commentary. In J. Baer, J. C. Kaufman & R. Baumeister (eds.), Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will. Oxford University Press. 325.

View all 9 references

Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Alfred R. Mele (2007). Free Will and Luck. Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):153 – 155.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2010-11-18

Total downloads

28 ( #60,791 of 1,098,410 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #173,311 of 1,098,410 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.