Skepticism: Lehrer versus Mooreanism

Philosophical Studies 161 (1):47-58 (2012)
Abstract
I will compare Lehrer’s anti-skeptical strategy from a coherentist point of view with the anti-skeptical strategy of the Mooreans. I will argue that there are strong similarities between them: neither can present a persuasive argument to the skeptic and both face the problem of easy knowledge in one way or another. However, both can offer a complete and self-explanatory explanation of knowledge although Mooreanism can offer the more natural one. Hence, one has good reasons to prefer Mooreanism to Lehrer’s anti-skeptical approach, if one does not prefer coherentism to foundationalism for other reasons.
Keywords Skepticism  Mooreanism  Keith Lehrer  Easy knowledge  Coherentism  Foundationalism  Bootstrapping
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    Stewart Cohen (2002). Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):309-329.
    Christopher S. Hill (1996). Process Reliabilism and Cartesian Scepticism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):567-581.

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    Duncan Pritchard (2006). McDowellian Neo-Mooreanism. In Fiona Macpherson & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. 283--310.
    Keith Lehrer (1989). Knowledge Reconsidered. In Marjorie Clay & Keith Lehrer (eds.), Knowledge and Skepticism. Westview Press.
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