Two cheers for reductionism, or, the dim prospects for nonreductive materialism

Philosophy of Science 62 (3):370-88 (1995)
I argue that a certain version of physicalism, which is viewed by both its admirers and its detractors as non-reductionist, in fact entails two claims which, though not reductionist in the currently most popular sense of 'reductionist', conform to the spirit of reductionism sufficiently closely to compromise its claim to be a comprehensively non-reductionist version of physicalism. Putatively non-reductionist versions of physicalism in general, I suggest, are likely to be non-reductionist only in some senses, but not in others, and hence to disappoint those who wish to be physicalists but still to remain soft and cuddly non-reductionists
Keywords Materialism  Physicalism  Reductionism  Science
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DOI 10.1086/289873
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Andrew Melnyk (1998). The Prospects for Kirk's Nonreductive Physicalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2):323-32.

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