David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind and Language 11 (2):203-15 (1996)
When a belief is cited as part of the explanation of an agent’s behaviour, it seems that the belief is explanatorily relevant in virtue of its content. In his Explaining Behavior, Dretske presents an account of belief, content, and explanation according to which this can be so. I supply some examples of beliefs whose explanatory relevance in virtue of content apparently cannot be accounted for in the Dretskean way. After considering some possible responses to this challenge, I end by discussing how serious these counterexamples are for Dretske’s account.
|Keywords||Belief Epistemology Meaning Dretske, F causal relevance|
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References found in this work BETA
Fred Dretske (1991). Dretske and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
Fred Dretske (1990). Reply to Reviewers. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4):819 - 839.
Jaegwon Kim (1991). Dretske and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
Dennis W. Stampe (1990). Desires as Reasons--Discussion Notes on Fred Dretske's Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4):787-793.
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