The prospects for Kirk's nonreductive physicalism

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2):323-32 (1998)
Abstract
Using the notion of strict implication, Robert Kirk claims to have formulated a version of physicalism which is nonreductive. I argue that, depending on how his notion of strict implication is interpreted, Kirk's formulation either fails to be physicalist or else commits him to reductionism. Either way we do not have nonreductive physicalism. I also suggest that the reductionism to which Kirk is committed, though unfashionable, is unobjectionable
Keywords Logic  Physicalism  Reductionism  Truth  Kirk, R
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References found in this work BETA
Donald Davidson (1970). Mental Events. In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory. Humanities Press. 79-101.
Robert Kirk (1996). Strict Implication, Supervenience, and Physicalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):244-57.

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Robert Kirk (1996). Strict Implication, Supervenience, and Physicalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):244-57.
Robert Kirk (2001). Nonreductive Physicalism and Strict Implication. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (4):544-552.
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