David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Psychology 12 (2):117-137 (1999)
In instances of "twisted" self-deception, people deceive themselves into believing things that they do not want to be true. In this, twisted self-deception differs markedly from the "straight" variety that has dominated the philosophical and psychological literature on self-deception. Drawing partly upon empirical literature, I develop a trio of approaches to explaining twisted self-deception: a motivation-centered approach; an emotion-centered approach; and a hybrid approach featuring both motivation and emotion. My aim is to display our resources for exploring and explaining twisted self-deception and to show that promising approaches are consistent with a plausible position on straight self-deception
|Keywords||Empiricism Psychology Science Self-deception|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Richard E. Nisbett & Lee Ross (1980). Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment. Prentice-Hall.
B. F. Skinner (1953). Science and Human Behavior. Free Press Collier-Macmillan.
Alfred R. Mele (1995). Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy. Oxford University Press.
Gerd Gigerenzer & Klaus Hug (1992). Domain-Specific Reasoning: Social Contracts, Cheating, and Perspective Change. Cognition 43 (2):127-171.
Citations of this work BETA
Tamar Szabó Gendler (2007). Self-Deception as Pretense. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):231 - 258.
Christoph Michel & Albert Newen (2010). Self-Deception as Pseudo-Rational Regulation of Belief. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (3):731-744.
Tamar Szabó Gendler (2007). Self-Deception as Pretense. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):231–258.
Kengo Miyazono (2015). Delusions as Harmful Malfunctioning Beliefs. Consciousness and Cognition 33:561-573.
Dion Scott-Kakures (2002). At "Permanent Risk": Reasoning and Self-Knowledge in Self-Deception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):576-603.
Similar books and articles
Alfred R. Mele (2000). Self-Deception and Emotion. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (1):115-137.
Howard Rachlin & Marvin Frankel (1997). The Uses of Self-Deception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):124-125.
Neil Van Leeuwen (2013). Self-Deception. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell
Clancy W. Martin (ed.) (2009). The Philosophy of Deception. Oxford University Press.
Dion Scott-Kakures (2001). High Anxiety: Barnes on What Moves the Unwelcome Believer. Philosophical Psychology 14 (3):313 – 326.
Lisa Damm (2011). Self-Deception About Emotion. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):254-270.
Robert Audi (1997). Self-Deception Vs. Self-Caused Deception: A Comment on Professor Mele. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):104-104.
Alfred R. Mele (1997). Understanding and Explaining Real Self-Deception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):127-134.
Alfred R. Mele (2001). Self-Deception Unmasked. Princeton University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads62 ( #53,422 of 1,725,631 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #72,319 of 1,725,631 )
How can I increase my downloads?