David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008)
To understand the thesis of actualism, consider the following example. Imagine a race of beings — call them ‘Aliens’ — that is very different from any life-form that exists anywhere in the universe; different enough, in fact, that no actually existing thing could have been an Alien, any more than a given gorilla could have been a fruitfly. Now, even though there are no Aliens, it seems intuitively the case that there could have been such things. After all, life might have evolved very differently than the way it did in fact. So in virtue of what is it true that there could have been Aliens when in fact there are none, and when, moreover, nothing that exists in fact could have been an Alien? So-called "possibilists" offer the following answer: ‘It is possible that there are Aliens’ is true because there are in fact individuals that could have been Aliens. At first blush, this might appear directly to contradict the premise that no existing thing could possibly have been an Alien. The possibilist's thesis, however, is that existence, or actuality, encompasses only a subset of the things that, in the broadest sense, are. So for the possibilist, ‘It is possible that there are Aliens’ is true simply in virtue of the fact that there are possible-but-nonactual Aliens, i.e., things that could have existed (but do not) and which would have been Aliens if they had. Actualists reject this answer; they deny that there are any nonactual individuals. Thus, actualism is the philosophical position that everything there is — everything that can in any sense be said to be — exists, or is actual.
|Keywords||actualism modal logic quantified modal logic possible worlds possible world semantics|
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Citations of this work BETA
Karen Bennett (2006). Proxy “Actualism”. Philosophical Studies 129 (2):263 - 294.
Olimpia Lombardi & Mario Castagnino (2008). A Modal-Hamiltonian Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 39 (2):380-443.
Otávio Bueno, Christopher Menzel & Edward N. Zalta (2013). Worlds and Propositions Set Free. Erkenntnis (4):1-24.
Richard Woodward (2011). The Things That Aren't Actually There. Philosophical Studies 152 (2):155 - 166.
Newton Costa, Olimpia Lombardi & Mariano Lastiri (2013). A Modal Ontology of Properties for Quantum Mechanics. Synthese 190 (17):3671-3693.
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