David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (6):63-84 (2008)
Is the self narratively constructed? There are many who would answer yes to the question. Dennett (1991) is, perhaps, the most famous proponent of the view that the self is narratively constructed, but there are others, such as Velleman (2006), who have followed his lead and developed the view much further. Indeed, the importance of narrative to understanding the mind and the self is currently being lavished with attention across the cognitive sciences (Dautenhahn, 2001; Hutto, 2007; Nelson, 2003). Emerging from this work, there appear to be a variety of ways in which we can think of the narrative construction of the self and the relationship between the narrative self and the embodied agent. I wish to examine two such ways in this paper. The first I shall call the abstract narrative account, this is because its proponents take the narrative self to be an abstraction (Dennett, 1991; Velleman, 2006). Dennett, for example, refers to the self as a centre of narrative gravity, to be thought of as analogous to a mathematical conception of the centre of gravity of an object. The second I shall call the embodied narrative account and this is the view that the self is constituted both by an embodied consciousness whose experiences are available for narration and narratives themselves, which can play a variety of roles in the agent’s psychological life.
|Keywords||Self Narrative Embodiment|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Diana Tietjens Meyers (2014). Corporeal Selfhood, Self-Interpretation, and Narrative Selfhood. Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):141-153.
Gary Williams (2011). What is It Like to Be Nonconscious? A Defense of Julian Jaynes. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (2):217-239.
Catriona Mackenzie (2014). Embodied Agents, Narrative Selves. Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):154-171.
Richard Menary (2010). Introduction to the Special Issue on 4E Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):459-463.
Fleur Jongepier (2016). Towards a Constitutive Account of Implicit Narrativity. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (1):51-66.
Similar books and articles
Tanya de Villiers & Paul Cilliers (2004). Narrating the Self: Freud, Dennett and Complexity Theory. South African Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):34-53.
Patrick Stokes (2012). Is Narrative Identity Four-Dimensionalist? European Journal of Philosophy 20 (S1):e86-e106.
Stephen Mulhall (2011). Theology and Narrative: The Self, the Novel, the Bible. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 69 (1):29-43.
Byron Almén (2008). A Theory of Musical Narrative. Indiana University Press.
Joan McCarthy (2007). Dennett and Ricoeur on the Narrative Self. Humanity Books.
Noël Carroll (2007). Narrative Closure. Philosophical Studies 135 (1):1 - 15.
Dan Zahavi (2007). Self and Other: The Limits of Narrative Understanding. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82 (60):179-.
Joseph Neisser (2008). Subjectivity and the Limits of Narrative. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (2):51-66.
Tone Kvernbekk (2003). On Identifying Narratives. Studies in Philosophy and Education 22 (3/4):267-279.
Marjorie Jolles (2012). Between Embodied Subjects and Objects: Narrative Somaesthetics. Hypatia 27 (2):301-318.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads447 ( #2,991 of 1,911,836 )
Recent downloads (6 months)57 ( #10,336 of 1,911,836 )
How can I increase my downloads?