David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Topoi 28 (1):31-43 (2009)
Naturalistic philosophers ought to think that the mind is continuous with the rest of the world and should not, therefore, be surprised by the findings of the extended mind, cognitive integration and enactivism. Not everyone is convinced that all mental phenomena are continuous with the rest of the world. For example, intentionality is often formulated in a way that makes the mind discontinuous with the rest of the world. This is a consequence of Brentano’s formulation of intentionality, I suggest, and can be overcome by revealing that the concept of intentional directedness as he receives it from the Scholastics is quite consistent with the continuity thesis. It is only when intentional directedness is conjoined with intentional inexistence that intentionality and content are consistent with a discontinuity thesis (such as Brentano’s thesis). This makes room to develop an account of intentional directedness that is consistent with the continuity thesis in the form of Peirce’s representational principle. I also argue against a form of the discontinuity thesis in the guise of the derived/underived content distinction. Having shown that intentionality is consistent with the continuity thesis I argue that we should focus on intentionality and representation as bodily enacted. I conclude that we would be better off focussing on representation and intentionality in action rather than giving abstract functional accounts of extended cognition.
|Keywords||Cognitive integration Enactivism Extended mind Intentionality Intentional directedness Naturalism Representation|
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References found in this work BETA
Frederick R. Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (2010). Defending the Bounds of Cognition. In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. Mit Press.
Andy Clark (2005). Intrinsic Content, Active Memory, and the Extended Mind. Analysis 65 (285):1-11.
Citations of this work BETA
Richard Menary (2010). The Holy Grail of Cognitivism: A Response to Adams and Aizawa. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):605-618.
Richard Menary (2010). Dimensions of Mind. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):561-578.
Shaun Gallagher (2012). Taking Stock of Phenomenology Futures. Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (2):304-318.
Richard Menary (2012). Cognitive Practices and Cognitive Character. Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):147 - 164.
Ciano Aydin (forthcoming). The Artifactual Mind: Overcoming the 'Inside–Outside' Dualism in the Extended Mind Thesis and Recognizing the Technological Dimension of Cognition. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-22.
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