Mental Representation and Closely Conflated Topics

Dissertation, Princeton University (2010)
This dissertation argues that mental representation is identical to phenomenal consciousness, and everything else that appears to be both mental and a matter of representation is not genuine mental representation, but either in some way derived from mental representation, or a case of non-mental representation.
Keywords mental representation  intentionality  consciousness  phenomenal intentionality  adverbialism
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