Probabilistic causation and causal processes: A critique of Lewis

Philosophy of Science 56 (4):642-663 (1989)
Abstract
This paper examines a promising probabilistic theory of singular causation developed by David Lewis. I argue that Lewis' theory must be made more sophisticated to deal with certain counterexamples involving pre-emption. These counterexamples appear to show that in the usual case singular causation requires an unbroken causal process to link cause with effect. I propose a new probabilistic account of singular causation, within the framework developed by Lewis, which captures this intuition
Keywords lewis causation
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Luke Glynn (2010). Deterministic Chance. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (1):51–80.

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