Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Studies 165 (2):421-443 (2013)
|Abstract||It is a live possibility that certain of our experiences reliably misrepresent the world around us. I argue that tracking theories of mental representation (e.g. those of Dretske, Fodor, and Millikan) have difficulty allowing for this possibility, and that this is a major consideration against them|
|Keywords||Mental representation Causal theories of mental representation Teleological theories of mental representation Asymmetric dependence Reliable misrepresentation Colors|
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