Reliable misrepresentation and tracking theories of mental representation

Philosophical Studies 165 (2):421-443 (2013)
Abstract
It is a live possibility that certain of our experiences reliably misrepresent the world around us. I argue that tracking theories of mental representation (e.g. those of Dretske, Fodor, and Millikan) have difficulty allowing for this possibility, and that this is a major consideration against them
Keywords Mental representation  Causal theories of mental representation  Teleological theories of mental representation  Asymmetric dependence  Reliable misrepresentation  Colors
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PhilPapers Archive Angela Mendelovici, Reliable misrepresentation and tracking theories of mental representation
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References found in this work BETA
Emmett L. Holman (2002). Color Eliminativism and Color Experience. Pacific Philosophical Quareterly 83 (1):38-56.

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Citations of this work BETA
Angela Mendelovici (2013). Intentionalism About Moods. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):126-136.
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Ruth G. Millikan (2009). Biosemantics. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Ansgar Beckerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. 281--297.
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