The Fundamental Theorem of World Theory
Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-31 (forthcoming)
| Abstract | The fundamental principle of the theory of possible worlds is that a proposition p is possible if and only there is a possible world at which p is true. In this paper we present a valid derivation of this principle from a more general theory in which possible worlds are defined rather than taken as primitive. The general theory uses a primitive modality and axiomatizes abstract objects, properties, and propositions. We then show that this general theory has very small models and hence that its ontological commitments — and, therefore, those of the fundamental principle of world theory — are minimal. | |||||||||
| Keywords | possible worlds propositions modality | |||||||||
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