Against the doctrine of microphysical supervenience

Mind 107 (425):59-71 (1998)
The doctrine of Microphysical Supervenience (MS) states that: Necessarily, if atoms A1 through An compose an object that exemplified intrinsic qualitative properties Q1 through Qn, then atoms like A1 through An (in all their respective intrinsic qualitative properties), related to one another by all the same restricted atom-to-atom relations as A1 through An, compose an object that exemplifies Q1 through Qn. I show that MS entails a contradiction and so must be rejected. And my argument against MS provides the resources to show that Global Microphysical Supervenience (GMS) is false. GMS states that possible worlds qualitatively exactly alike at the microphysical level are qualitatively exactly alike at the macrophysical level
Keywords Atom  Microphysics  Science  Supervenience
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DOI 10.1093/mind/107.425.59
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Theodore Sider (2003). Maximality and Microphysical Supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):139-149.
Richard Healey (2013). Physical Composition. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 44 (1):48-62.
Andrew M. Bailey (2014). You Needn't Be Simple. Philosophical Papers 43 (2):145-160.

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