David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 46 (1):98-117 (1979)
It is argued that Hempel's original rejection of the prediction criterion of confirmation in  (on the grounds that it leads to a circular definition of confirmation) was ill-conceived, and that his own approach exhibits undesirable consequences to the degree that it deviates from this criterion. A version of the prediction criterion is formulated which, in addition to being-non circular, escapes the criticisms advanced against Hempel's satisfaction criterion, offers certain clear advantages over alternative approaches, and may serve as the basis for a theory of qualitative confirmation. The definition of confirmation developed here violates two of Hempel's three criteria of adequacy, and in showing why it should do so some light is shed on various issues in the debate concerning the acceptability of these criteria
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