David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophia 37 (3):535-556 (2009)
Moral discourse allows for speakers to disagree in many ways: about right and wrong acts, about moral theory, about the rational and conative significance of moral failings. Yet speakers’ eccentricities do not prevent them from engaging in moral conversation or from having (genuine, not equivocal) moral disagreement. Thus differences between speakers are compatible with possession of moral concepts. This paper examines various kinds of moral disagreements and argues that they provide evidence against conceptual-role and informational atomist approaches to understanding our moral concepts. Conceptual role approaches fail because they cannot account for shared concepts among speakers with different commitments to the practical and conative ramifications of moral judgments. Informational atomist views fail because speakers need not be locked on to the same moral properties to share moral concepts.
|Keywords||Moral Concepts Disagreement Fodor Jackson Wedgwood|
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Citations of this work BETA
Matti Eklund (2012). Alternative Normative Concepts. Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):139-157.
Tristram McPherson (2013). Semantic Challenges to Normative Realism. Philosophy Compass 8 (2):126-136.
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