Possessing moral concepts

Philosophia 37 (3):535-556 (2009)
Abstract
Moral discourse allows for speakers to disagree in many ways: about right and wrong acts, about moral theory, about the rational and conative significance of moral failings. Yet speakers’ eccentricities do not prevent them from engaging in moral conversation or from having (genuine, not equivocal) moral disagreement. Thus differences between speakers are compatible with possession of moral concepts. This paper examines various kinds of moral disagreements and argues that they provide evidence against conceptual-role and informational atomist approaches to understanding our moral concepts. Conceptual role approaches fail because they cannot account for shared concepts among speakers with different commitments to the practical and conative ramifications of moral judgments. Informational atomist views fail because speakers need not be locked on to the same moral properties to share moral concepts.
Keywords Moral  Concepts  Disagreement  Fodor  Jackson  Wedgwood
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    References found in this work BETA
    Julia Annas (2004). Being Virtuous and Doing the Right Thing. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 78 (2):61 - 75.
    David O. Brink (2001). Realism, Naturalism, and Moral Semantics. Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (02):154-.
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    Citations of this work BETA
    Matti Eklund (2012). Alternative Normative Concepts. Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):139-157.
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